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Organization of the 2 Branch Unit

- 1. On 15 March 1952, following an order by the First Political Institute in P'yongyang, the 2 Branch Unit of the North Korean 526 Army Unit was established in Hahyon-ni (127-58, 38-32) (DT-1065). The headquarters of the 2 Branch Unit was in a civilian house in Hahyon-ni, the Front Line Liaison Office was in a civilian house in Sangbukchom-ni (128-01, 38-35) (DT-1471), and the Eastern Liaison Office was at Sanghyon-ni (127-58, 38-32) (DT-1065). Fifteen men from the headquarters of the 526 Army Unit, some of whom had been in Communist underground activities in South Korea prior to June 1950, were assigned to this branch unit as advisers and investigators to check on personnel and activities.
- 2. The 2 Branch Unit was divided into five sections as follows:
 - a. Secret Section. This section was staffed with six men who were responsible for the filing of documents and for maintaining radio contact with P'yongyang.
 - b. Security Section. This section comprised three officers and a master sergeant, who maintained security and were responsible for observing any ideological wavering among branch unit personnel.
 - c. Party Affairs Section. This section had five men who were responsible for managing North Korean Labor Party affairs and recruiting new members.
 - d. 1 Platoon. The 1 Platoon was directly attached to the 2 Branch Unit and was responsible for making all preparations for the infiltration of agents

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into South Korea. The platoon had 120 men, comprising an armed communications unit and three squads, each squad made up of five groups of five to six men each. The armed communications group was charged with maintaining radio contact with North Korean agents in South Korea. Radio operators and communications technicians in the group were trained in a school at Sanghyon-ni from the first week of March until 15 May 1952.

e. Independent 2 Platoon. This platoon had 40 men divided into five groups: motor transportation, conveyance by human carriers, labor, supply, and external affairs.

Agents

- 3. Agents of the 526 Army Unit were dispatched to South Korea with the following objectives: to cooperate with guerrilla units in South Korea in a campaign to incite riots; to strengthen guerrilla units, primarily by means of a recruitment campaign; to organize mobile propaganda units and direct people in the distribution of propaganda leaflets; to conduct sabotage activities aimed at communication and other facilities; to organize Communist underground cells; to expand the activities of social organizations such as the Democratic Youth Alliance, the Democratic Women's Alliance, and the Farmers' Alliance; and to collect information.
- 4. Most of the agents dispatched by the 526 Army Unit were men who had formerly lived in South Korea. After one month of training at the P'yongyang First Political Institute, also known as the Mangyongdae School, prospective agents were transferred to the Eastern Liaison Office at Sanghyon-ni where they received more specialized training. About 100 agents were sent to South Korea during April and May 1952, and it was planned that another 100 would be infiltrated by the end of June 1952. These men were treated exceptionally well and great care was taken to build up their incentive and morale. However, some of the men faced their tasks with fear and repugnance and some feigned illness to avoid the work.
- 5. Agents to be infiltrated, usually five to seven at a time, were escorted to the area to be penetrated by four armed men from the 1 Platoon. After selection of the infiltration point agreed on by all concerned, the agents and their escorts entered the area to a point 4 to 8 kilometers behind United Nations lines. Here two of the escorts left the group and returned to the 2 Branch Unit Headquarters to report on the success of the infiltration. The two remaining escorts accompanied the agents to their destinations, after which they returned to headquarters to give further details about the success of the mission.
- 6. Agents and their escorts were dressed either in civilian clothes or in American army fatigues, and agents were supplied with counterfeited South Korean provincial citizenship cards, counterfeited South Korean military service registration cards, about 200,000 won in South Korean bank notes, food rations to last for 20 days, medicines, some cotton cloth, and a dagger 20 centimeters long. Some of the men carried false certificates identifying them as special agents of the Intelligence and Investigation Section, Bureau of Public Security of the ROK National Police.

1.	Comment. Possibly this is a reference to one of the schools	_	
	established under the Political General Bureau	or	25X1
	it may refer to the Political General Bureau itself.		

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25X1 Comment. In May 1952 the headquarters of the 526 Army Unit, which is an intelligence organization under the direct control of the general headquarters of the North Korean Army, was in a foreign style building in front of the KIM Il-song University in P'yongyang; 25X1 Comment. while the 526 Army Unit may have been a military organization, it was under the control of the NKLP through the Political General Bureau, and furnished facilities for infiltration of various types of agents into the ROK. The 526 Unit was dissolved in April 1952, The possible replacement of the 526 Unit by the 57 Division, under the control of a newly-formed North Korean Labor Party organization called the National Salvation Struggle Alliance which was to direct subversive operations against the ROK government Since it is probable, however, that the same fundamental organization of subordinate units to handle the functions here discussed will continue exist under one name or another

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